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Abstract: Our knowledge-based society is pressing universities to transform 
from monastic scholarly enclaves into producers of new technologies and 
incubators of start-up firms. However, converting scientists’ curiosity-driven 
discoveries into commercially viable innovations has proven so difficult that 
observers liken the journey to crossing a ‘Valley of Death’. We conceptualise 
the challenges of commercialising university inventions in terms of three gaps: 
the technology discovery gap, the commercialisation gap, and the venture 
launch gap. We chronicle the inception and evolution of a technology 
commercialisation programme at the University of Oregon, relating how the 
university confronted and dealt with the three gaps, and describing the  
intra-organisational partnerships developed to address them. We find that 
negotiating the gaps requires assimilation of a technology commercialisation 
mission into the traditional academic missions of education and scientific 
discovery. To do this, universities must confront fundamental contradictions 
between learning, discovery, and commercialisation. 
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Innovation and economic development have grown dependent upon knowledge 
resources, sparking a transformation in the role of research universities (Etzkowitz et al., 
2000). Universities are increasingly expected to contribute directly to technological 
innovation, incubate start-up firms, and play a role in regional economic development. In 
response to these rising expectations, universities are undertaking initiatives to promote 
the commercialisation of the technologies developed in their laboratories (Bercovitz and 
Feldmann, 2006). 
However, the path from laboratory research findings to marketable products is full of 
twists and turns and often ends in failure (Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1987; Henderson 
and Clark, 1990). Scholars recognise that shepherding technology down the path from lab 
to market is inherently risky (Ziamou, 2002). Policy makers agree and have adopted the 
term ‘Valley of Death’ to underscore the funding gap facing entrepreneurs seeking to 
transform scientific inventions into commercial innovations. Auerswald and Branscomb 
(2003) argue that even before they reach the valley, university technologies must swim 
through a ‘Darwinian sea’ fraught with the clashing cultures of university technologists 
and business people, scientists with divergent motives for conducting research, meagre 
seed-stage investment funds, and a dearth of the complementary human, material, and 
organisational assets necessary for commercialisation. In this paper, we argue that a 
university-developed technology must negotiate the three gaps shown in Figure 1 to reach 
the commercial marketplace. 
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Figure 1 Gaps in the commercialisation of university technology 
 
The technology discovery gap separates cutting-edge scientific discoveries from the 
evaluation of their commercial feasibility. Crossing it involves translation of scientific 
concepts and terminology into natural language, demonstration of proof of concept and 
development of market-ready prototypes, and exploration of the invention’s intellectual 
property landscape. Motivating bench scientists to disclose and commercially develop 
their discoveries presents a challenge for many universities owing to a variety of 
professional, organisational and cultural factors (Thursby and Thursby, 2002, 2004; 
Bercovitz and Feldman, 2006). 
The commercialisation gap lies between a potentially feasible commercial 
opportunity and a validated business case ready to accept investment. Crossing this gap 
entails developing a mechanism for creating value, formulating a business model that can 
capture part of that value, and identifying an addressable target market. These bellwethers 
of feasibility are rarely available for early stage university technologies, creating a 
commercialisation gap between inventors and entrepreneurs (Hsu and Bernstein, 1997; 
Shane, 2002). 
Finally, spinning a technology-based start-up out of a university engenders a host of 
challenges related to venture formation and funding (Lockett et al., 2003). This venture 
launch gap cannot be spanned until ownership of the underlying technology is secured, a 
credible management team has committed to the launch, and seed funding has been 
secured. Without all three components in place, professional investors are unlikely to 
underwrite the venture’s launch. 
Although the literature on university entrepreneurship has expanded rapidly in recent 
years (Rothaermel et al., 2007), most scholars conceptualise the commercialisation of 
inventions as a series of transactions between a university and a commercial firm 
(Bercovitz and Feldman, 2006). Researchers have detailed the hurdles that stand in the 
way of public-private partnerships (Tuunainen, 2005; Rasmussen et al., 2006), but they 
have typically modelled intra-organisational dynamics of university technology 
commercialisation as a black box (Bercovitz and Feldman, 2006). We explore these 
dynamics by chronicling the development of a programme focusing on early-stage 
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university technology commercialisation. We identify conflicts that surfaced between 
basic research, discovery, and commercialisation, and describe intra-organisational 
partnerships developed to address these conflicts. 
This case study presents a narrative account of the origins, evolution, and structure of 
the technology entrepreneurship program (TEP) developed at the University of Oregon 
(UO). This programme creates multidisciplinary educational experiences by immersing 
students from the university’s business, law, and science graduate programmes in 
authentic technology commercialisation processes. We relate how TEP came into being, 
report on the proponents’ encounters with the gaps shown in Figure 1, and describe their 
responses to the gaps. Our aim is to identify heuristics that may guide other universities 
seeking to establish technology commercialisation programmes. We include our missteps 
and recoveries in the hope that others can learn vicariously and avoid our mistakes. 
This paper’s first author was a partner in the informal coalition that established TEP. 
In writing the case, we drew upon naturalistic observations, semi-structured interviews 
with key participants, programme documents, press releases, and grant applications. We 
describe the inception and evolution of the UO’s technology commercialisation 
programme in the order in which it unfolded. This was a stochastic process, influenced by 
the actions and decisions of many individuals and organisations and by serendipitous 
events. Our case begins with the commercialisation gap, the first to be addressed by the 
UO’s programme, and proceeds to discuss the other two gaps in the order in which they 
became salient. 
2 Confronting the commercialisation gap 
2.1 Regional economics, technological innovation, and university research 
In the early 1990s, stagnation in Oregon’s wood products industry coupled with rapid 
growth in the high technology sector sparked state tax credit legislation that lured 
chipmakers such as Intel, LSI Logic, and Hyundai to set up plants in Oregon. These firms 
took advantage of Oregon’s cheap land, plentiful water, educated workforce, and low 
cost of living. In exchange they brought the state thousands of new jobs and tax revenues. 
But these new plants were not Oregon companies. They provided jobs and salaries, but 
were beholden to outside interests and exported profits and talent. Furthermore, they had 
few ties to Northwest research universities. Oregon’s high technology sector was largely 
dependent on outside influences: no mechanism existed to commercialise locally 
developed technologies and grow them in the regional economy. 
Like their counterparts all across the US, proponents of economic development in the 
Northwest called upon Oregon’s research universities to catalyse technology-based 
manufacturing clusters modelled after California’s Silicon Valley, Massachusetts’ Route 
128, and North Carolina’s Research Triangle Park. Social scientists had coined the term 
‘entrepreneurial university’ (Etzkowitz, 1983) to describe the new role of the research 
university in technology commercialisation, and empirical reports of this new approach 
were appearing in academic journals (Mian, 1996, 1997; Geuna, 1998; Powell and Owen-
Smith, 1998; Mowrey et al., 1999; Siegel et al., 2003). 
However, efforts to foment university entrepreneurship in Oregon confronted 
significant barriers. Oregon’s major institutions are geographically dispersed: the state’s 
capital, commercial centre, premier engineering school, and leading business school are 
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each located in a different metropolitan area, separated by 40 miles or more.  
University-based technology transfer offices had been established only recently. Thus, 
the fundamental challenges of technology commercialisation were compounded by 
additional challenges of evangelising, aligning, and coordinating efforts across spatially 
dispersed public and private institutions. This case study chronicles the UO’s efforts to 
surmount these challenges. 
2.2 Inception of the UO’s TEP 
An impromptu breakfast meeting in November of 2001 laid the foundation for a 
partnership between the UO’s business school and the Pacific Northwest National 
Laboratory (PNNL). The director of the UO’s Lundquist Center for Entrepreneurship and 
the director of commercialisation at PNNL hatched a plan to allow MBA students to 
investigate the market potential of technologies invented by PNNL scientists. Several 
days later, the director of the UO law school’s Center for Law and Entrepreneurship 
joined the new TEP to bring law students’ expertise in patenting and intellectual property 
into the mix. 
From its inception, TEP’s mission focused upon catalysing and accelerating the 
formation of new technology-based businesses. At the heart of the collaboration, 
however, lay a commitment by each TEP partner to provide graduate students with  
live-fire experiences in evaluating, planning, structuring, and financing the launch of 
high-technology start-ups. Importantly, technology commercialisation provided a vehicle 
to pursue interdisciplinary education, rather than serving as the programme’s raison 
d’être. The TEP programme director put it like this: 
“The priority is educating students, whether they wind up starting up a business 
based on TEP or start-up something completely different, working as an 
entrepreneur, intrapreneur, or corporate employee. We recruit students with the 
promise to teach them a process for commercializing an innovation, and just as 
importantly, how to sell their ideas in an effective and compelling way.” 
Five months after conception, the scheme that had been scratched out on a napkin took 
form as a summer fellowship programme that mobilised UO graduate students in 
business and law to assess the commercial viability of PNNL technologies. Two 
interdisciplinary teams were formed in the summer of 2002, presented with promising 
technologies, and assigned business and law faculty mentors. Financial stipends for the 
graduate student participants were tied directly to achieving four predetermined 
milestones, each requiring written and oral deliverables. The new TEP Fellows visited 
PNNL’s laboratories where they met with the inventors and PNNL’s commercialisation 
staff. PhD students and postdoctoral researchers from the physics and biology 
departments were recruited to serve as science advisors to the business and law student 
teams. 
When the teams presented their conclusions and recommendations at summer’s end, 
the results exceeded everyone’s expectations. Students spoke effusively about the 
insights they had achieved through their interdisciplinary work. When the fall academic 
term began, one team enrolled en masse in the UO’s business planning course to pursue 
their project, and eventually went on to compete in university business plan competitions. 
The value students received is captured in the following testimonial from an MBA 
student: 
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“I am amazed by what I have learned in the last three months. First, I feel like I 
took an advanced seminar in nanotechnology. My professor was the  
major-league scientist who invented our technology – and I had a PhD student 
in chemistry as my personal tutor. Second, I learned a whopping amount about 
intellectual property and patenting from my law-school team mate. But what 
really amazes me is this – by the time I finally got a chemist to understand 
marketing and a lawyer to understand accounting, I realised I’d learned more 
about business than I did in the whole first year of my MBA.” 
2.3 Growing the partnership and extending the educational experience 
Flushed with the first year’s success, the TEP partners reviewed and refined the pilot 
effort, began planning the programme’s second year, and solicited the support of other 
units on campus. The Vice President for Research offered up seed funding, the deans of 
the business and law schools provided additional financial support, and the director of the 
campus office of technology transfer agreed to provide UO technologies for 
consideration, supplementing PNNL scientists’ technologies with others invented by UO 
faculty. 
The products of TEP’s summer feasibility assessments had been successfully ported 
into the business planning course that was already being offered in the MBA 
entrepreneurship curriculum. However, the written business plans that emerged from this 
course proved far too preliminary for serious consideration by professional investors. So 
in TEP’s second year, faculty extended the runway by designing the ‘venture launch 
pathway’, a six-month period of intense mentoring by faculty; exposure to tough, often 
brutal feedback provided by angel investors, venture capitalists, and other service 
providers to the entrepreneurial community; and business plan competitions where 
student teams received more hard questions and candid feedback. Mentors from the 
business and investment communities joined UO business and law faculty in helping the 
teams revamp their written plans; venture capital firms and intellectual property attorneys 
appraised and critiqued their investor presentations. 
2.4 TEP structure 
TEP was institutionalised in 2003 in the form of a memorandum of understanding 
expressing the partners’ firm commitment to the programme, and reaffirming the 
programme’s focus on interdisciplinary education. The programme was offered again in 
2004 and 2005, with incremental refinements and modest growth. By the end of its fifth 
year, the TEP programme had stabilised around a set of tested organisational routines. 
The programme cycle began each spring with solicitation of applications from first-year 
MBA students, second-year law students and graduate students in biology, physics and 
chemistry. As summarised in Table 1, the programme unfolds in six phases, with the first 
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Table 1 TEP programme cycle 




 May 1–30 
• PNNL and UO Tech Transfer present to new Fellows and Science 
Advisors a set of high-potential proprietary technologies for their 
consideration. 
• Fellows travel to the PNNL facility, and confer with scientist 
inventors and technology commercialisation managers. Similar 
visits are held with UO scientists in their labs. 
• Each TEP team winnows the potential technologies, and selects the 






• TEP teams conduct technology diligence, guided by scientist 
inventors, technology transfer professionals, and faculty advisors. 
Teams explore the following issues: 
• technology description 
• differentiating features 
• boundaries of application 
• patents filed/issued 
Market assessment 3 
July 1–30 
• TEP teams conduct market diligence, guided by faculty advisors 
with expertise in technology commercialisation, and industry 
mentors with expertise in new product and business development. 
Teams explore the following issues and present in-depth oral and 
written reports: 
• array of potential applications 
• customer needs analysis 
• market segmentation analysis 





• TEP teams conduct industry analyses, select most attractive market 
segments, and assess overall commercial feasibility. 
• TEP teams formally present in-depth written and oral assessments 
of their technology’s potential for commercialisation to their 
business, law, and science faculty; UO deans; PNNL executives; 
regional venture capitalists; and economic development agencies. 
  Academic year activities 
New venture 
planning 
Sept. 15–Dec. 15 
5 
 
• During fall term, TEP teams convinced that their technology 
presents an attractive commercial opportunity enrol in LCB’s 
graduate business planning course, and spend the term building a 
professional business plan for launching a new venture, and 
preparing a presentation to investors. 
• In December, TEP teams present their business plans at Venture 
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Table 1 TEP programme cycle (continued) 
TEP phase Academic year activities 
6 Venture launch 
pathway 
January 1–June 15 
• Teams enrol in workshop seminars, where working closely with 
mentors with start-up and business development experience, they 
refine and extend their business plans and prepare them for 
presentation to investors. 
• Teams visit angel investors and IP law firms, make investor 
presentations, receive critiques and advice. 
• Teams present plans at major international business plan 
competitions, with travel expenses paid by the Lundquist Center 
for Entrepreneurship. 
3 Confronting the technology discovery gap 
3.1 Finding markets for embryonic technologies 
TEP had been designed to close the ‘commercialisation gap’ shown in Figure 1. 
However, many student teams floundered at the beginning, had trouble achieving the 
programme’s milestones on schedule, and hit their stride only near the end of the 
summer. TEP faculty concluded that the ‘technology discovery gap’ was a major 
stumbling block. Jensen and Thursby (2001) point out that many university-developed 
technologies are so embryonic that they are doomed to remain in the lab unless incentives 
induce ongoing collaboration between the inventors and the entrepreneurs seeking to take 
them to market. Many of TEP’s student participants reported that technology discovery 
had been the most difficult and time-consuming phase in the process. Despite the tutelage 
of their doctoral student science advisors, MBAs and law students reported that 
programme milestones had forced them to plunge ahead into industry and market analysis 
before they fully understood the functional mechanisms, advantages, and limitations of 
their technologies. 
Upon achieving demonstration in principle in the lab, few scientists are eager to plow 
forward to develop a fully functioning prototype. Many promising TEP technologies 
were very early in their development, compounding the difficulty of technology 
discovery. Even entrepreneurially inclined faculty inventors often could not fathom the 
business and legal issues involved in technology commercialisation. Some of the 
technologies offered up by PNNL had reached a more mature developmental stage than 
those from the academic labs. But even here, difficulties in comprehending scientific 
language and business jargon opened up a gap between new-to-the-world technologies 
and serious business ideas ready for evaluation as investment opportunities. The director 
of the TEP programme provided the following illustration of the technology discovery 
gap: 
“In the summer of 2004, one of the more exciting technologies presented 
during Phase 1 was a chemical ‘crab’ that could negotiate multiple liquid 
media, seek out toxic metals, latch onto them, and safely destroy them. 
However, this entire process was based on a scientist’s theoretical assumptions 
about how this would work. He had not demonstrated the capturing mechanism 
on the bench. He offered compelling arguments about how it should be possible 
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to capture multiple metals in multiple media. His reasoning was logical and 
convincing to other scientists.” 
“But he had never actually made it work. The teams were faced with spending 
the next 13 months developing a venture around theoretical musings, not a 
proven technology. So every one of our TEP teams headed off in another 
direction. What was most frustrating was that a number of our participants 
initially ranked this technology highest for innovativeness and potential. But in 
the last analysis, none of our teams were willing to bet their time on unproven 
ideas.” 
3.2 Narrowing the technology discovery gap 
Discussions about the technology discovery gap with the partners at PNNL and UO 
technology transfer staff led TEP’s leaders to rethink the processes they used to assemble 
menus of technologies presented to students for selection. TEP staff began asking OTT 
and PNNL to nominate potential technologies earlier in the cycle, providing time for the 
vetting of the technologies by TEP staff with input from early-stage investors and 
technology commercialisation experts. This vetting winnowed prospective technologies, 
eliminating those that were simply too early in their development. TEP leaders 
encouraged OTT to cast a wider net, reaching beyond the biology, physics, and chemistry 
departments to include inventions and innovations emerging from more applied 
disciplines such as education and computer science. 
TEP leaders conferred with the UO Vice President for Research, who was beginning 
experimentation with ‘translational research grants’ to fund proof of concept research by 
faculty inventors who expressed interest in commercialising their embryonic 
technologies. Finally, having observed that science PhD students’ involvement in TEP 
was more limited than hoped, TEP leaders moved to expand their role from that of 
consultant/advisor to full team membership. Increasing their involvement entailed 
discussions with the PhD students’ faculty advisors, some of whom embraced the 
traditional norms of ‘open science’ that value publications rather than patents (Bercovitz 
and Feldman, 2005), and maintained that their protégées’ summers should be devoted to 
bench work in the lab rather than commercialisation projects with business and law 
professionals. Nevertheless, federal funding for basic research was declining, the level of 
corporate sponsored research was growing, and many younger scientists were more 
comfortable with the technology transfer model (Bercovitz and Feldman, 2008). Summer 
stipends and personal advocacy provided by the VP Research were helpful in overcoming 
faculty resistance. 
4 Confronting the venture launch gap 
4.1 New ventures launched by TEP 
Beginning in 2004, the TEP programme moved beyond evaluating technologies’ market 
potential to catalysing the formation of new ventures. The programme began to spin out 
technology start-ups at the rate of about one per year. Each of these start-ups launched 
under the leadership of members of the business and law student teams who had initially 
selected and evaluated the technologies and developed the business plans for their 
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commercialisation. Three of the four businesses are ongoing, and two of the three have 
negotiated a license and secured the ongoing involvement of their technology’s inventor 
in the role of advisor or chief technology officer. 
• CleanSmart, founded in 2004 upon a patented PNNL technology for reverse micelles 
in supercritical carbon dioxide, discovered an application for removing highly toxic 
chromated copper arsenate from pressure-treated wood that has been taken out of 
service. After graduating, two members of the TEP team incorporated CleanSmart as 
a C-Corp and began negotiating a sub-license for the technology. Unfortunately, the 
firm holding the license suddenly lost interest in pursuing the technology and 
abandoned their licensing contract, bringing CleanSmart’s development to a halt. 
• Perpetua Power Source Technologies, Inc., founded upon a patented PNNL 
technology for harvesting thermoelectric ambient energy, is developing  
ultra-long-lasting energy sources to power wireless sensors. Perpetua launched in 
2005, secured seed funding, and negotiated an exclusive license to the PNNL 
technology. A graduate of the Oregon MBA programme has led the company since 
its inception in TEP. Perpetua now has assembled a seasoned management team and 
successfully completed two rounds of venture funding. 
• Floragenex was founded in 2006 upon a patented UO technology for rapid detection 
of genetic factors that are directly linked to the characteristics of mature plants. This 
information can be used to breed plants with superior characteristics in far less time 
than is possible with current breeding methods. Floragenex is headed by the MBA 
graduate who guided the firm through the TEP programme. The faculty biologist 
who invented the technology joined Floragenex as Chief Technology Officer. The 
start-up has licensed its technology from the UO, secured its first beta customer and 
project, and was recently awarded a venture launch grant by the Oregon University 
Venture Fund. 
• TakeShape developed a business plan in 2008 around a PNNL technology that 
creates three-dimensional images of the human body safely and non-invasively. 
Three members the TEP student team who wrote the plan have gone on to pursue a 
venture launch after graduation. The TakeShape team intends to change how athletes 
set goals and track their progress. For college and professional sports teams, 
TakeShape promises a revolutionary new way to evaluate talent. For health clubs, 
the team offers a total workout solution to help clubs attract and retain members. As 
of October 2008, TakeShape had secured commitments to over $500,000 in seed 
funding and was in the final stage of securing a license from PNNL for exclusive use 
of the technology in the athletic and fitness markets. 
4.2 Negotiating licenses and building management teams 
Perpeta and Floragenex both made it across what we call the ‘venture launch gap’ (see 
Figure 1). Perpetua’s founder spent over two years tenaciously pitching to prospective 
investors and cobbling together a strong management team before he was able to finalise 
license negotiations and secure his venture capital funding. This time and energy could 
have been better invested in developing the business. “It was worse than ‘Catch-22’,” 
Perpetua’s founder said. “I needed seed funding, IP, and a credible team. But whenever I 
went out looking for any one of these things, I was told to come back after I’d nailed 
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down the other two.” Floragenex’s CEO found it less challenging to secure his start-up’s 
intellectual property, perhaps because he was negotiating with a licensing professional 
who was a close associate of one of TEP’s co-sponsors in the UO Office of Technology 
Transfer. Even so, the young CEO had to mortgage his home to launch the business, and 
he must now divide his time between pursuing the beta project that will demonstrate the 
technology’s viability and soliciting additional funds to support that project. 
The venture launch gap swallowed up other aspiring new ventures. CleanSmart was 
stopped in its tracks at the technology licensing stage. Eventually, team members had to 
pursue other employment options to service their student loans, bringing CleanSmart’s 
development to a halt. The jury is still out on TakeShape. The venture launch gap did not 
take the TEP staff by surprise, but crossing it proved considerably more difficult than 
anticipated. 
4.3 Grappling with conflicting goals 
When TEP began to spin out technology ventures, the latent tension between TEP’s dual 
focus on educating students and commercialising technologies rose to the surface. The 
programme’s educational model immersed teams in an experiential setting that 
replicated, formalised, and accelerated the organic technology commercialisation process. 
The programme’s effectiveness arose from its authenticity, and TEP’s first spinouts 
injected realism and energy. But as teams’ rising expectations were dashed by the venture 
launch gap, their disappointment began to jeopardise the TEP programme’s reputation. 
By the conclusion of the 15-month programme, many students had learned their 
technology, packaged it in a professional business plan, assimilated the critical 
commentary of their TEP mentors, pitched the concept to no-nonsense professional 
investors, and presented the case at several university-sponsored business plan 
competitions. At each stage, they had taken criticism and staved off pot-shots; after each 
presentation, they had picked up the pieces of their plan and gone home to reassemble 
them into a sturdier configuration. During this process, teams bonded tightly and came to 
identify closely with ‘their’ technology and its business plan. After learning so much and 
working so long, students became convinced that they had earned the right to carry the 
project forward. Often, the TEP faculty concurred. However, the programme’s director 
reframed the problem posed by the venture launch gap in this way: 
“We need to remember that over 90% of our students will not start-up an 
entrepreneurial business right after graduation, and while we need to have some 
start-ups, they are not the primary focus of our efforts … My sense is that many 
programs similar to ours started out with education as the central goal (as we 
did), but through mission creep, educational goals gave way to trying to 
maximize revenue, deals, IP licenses, business competition prizes, and other 
metrics. If we want to avoid pitfalls that have diverted other programs, we must 
never lose sight of the importance of delivering value to all of our students.” 
Having reaffirmed experiential education as their fundamental objective, TEP programme 
leaders re-engaged the problems posed by the venture launch gap. As Perpetua’s founder 
pointed out, TEP teams on the launch pad faced three challenges – licensing the 
technology, securing seed funding, and building a strong and credible management team. 
Although, TEP’s sponsors in PNNL and OTT recognised and applauded the student 
teams’ accomplishments, their licensing professionals had reservations about consigning 
valuable intellectual property to students with limited industry experience. Unlike most of 
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the students, PNNL and OTT knew that along the path to commercialisation lay 
professional investors who would shy away from funding a team lacking seasoned 
managers with experience in launching start-up ventures. TEP’s programme director 
provided an example: 
“One of our first teams, AquaEssence, worked with a technology from PNNL 
based on self-assembling monolayers on mesoporous supports. The monolayers 
contained molecules immobilised on a scaffold that could absorb arsenic 
molecules from drinking water. This was a great team that identified an 
attractive market.” 
“However, when it came time to negotiate a license and raise funding, PNNL 
balked, and the team fell apart. Some of its members received attractive job 
offers, and they weren’t willing or able to risk job security for the uncertain 
world of entrepreneurship. Several of the team members were close to going 
the venture launch route, but in the end none of them took the leap. The TEP 
programme was left with a great technology and a viable business plan, but no 
one to execute.” 
In short, despite significant accomplishments and impressive performance in business 
plan competitions, many TEP graduates discovered that pursuing their new venture was 
impossible, and opted to accept job offers from corporations or law firms. Even those 
who persevered and launched their ventures struggled to secure seed funding and 
negotiate licenses for the technology. TEP faculty had invested substantial human and 
financial resources in training and mentoring TEP students. Students had forsaken other 
academic and personal goals while they transformed embryonic technologies into 
credible investment opportunities. Nevertheless, the usual result was a defunct venture – 
delivering no economic benefits to the inventor or the student entrepreneurs. 
5 Programne evaluation: taking stock of TEP 
As the 2005 programme cycled to a close, TEP staff conducted an in-depth examination 
of the programme’s accomplishments, shortfalls, and future prospects. 
5.1 Interdisciplinary education 
TEP had exceeded the founders’ expectations in terms of creating a rich learning 
environment. The evaluators agreed that the programme had assumed a major role in the 
experiential education of MBAs, law students, and to lesser extent science graduate 
students. TEP participants had experienced the challenges of multidisciplinary teamwork, 
used and integrated the tools of legal and business professionals, and understood the 
process of bringing a scientific discovery to market. Students found their employment 
opportunities enhanced, and highly qualified new applicants were being attracted to the 
UO’s graduate programmes solely by the prospect of being selected to participate in TEP. 
Working in interdisciplinary TEP teams provided a real-world experience afforded by no 
other academic programme at the university. 
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5.2 Accelerating technology transfer 
Mapping the TEP programme onto our three-gap model (Figure 1), TEP had made 
significant strides toward closing the commercialisation gap. Results of the programme’s 
efforts to span the technology discovery gap, however, were mixed. At UO, TEP teams 
lacked access to engineering or medical school researchers, whose discoveries are often 
focused on real-world problems. Instead, teams typically worked with technologies that 
focused on basic science. TEP students continued to struggle with the challenge of 
transforming curiosity-driven discoveries of academic scientists into commercial 
products. 
TEP’s technology transfer partners offered a more positive assessment. PNNL 
reported that the students’ analyses had uncovered unforeseen and promising applications 
for their technologies, and characterised their work as more valuable than similar 
assessments received when they’d engaged professional business development 
consultants. Moreover, the benefits were not limited to cases in which the student team 
had concluded that their technology offered a viable commercial opportunity. In other 
cases – after investigating industry structure, competitive rivalry, other emerging 
technologies, customer needs, and the intellectual property landscape – teams had 
recommended against commercialisation. PNNL’s commercialisation manager reported 
that they found such ‘negative results’ every bit as valuable as positive results. The 
university’s Director of Technology Transfer offered a complementary viewpoint: 
“Information that exposes limitations, concerns or non-existent markets is 
really useful to our innovators, who may have little experience in assessing 
these factors. TEP teams’ negative findings have pointed innovators in a 
slightly different direction that put them on a fast track toward improvement. 
Or it may be that the basic research is 15 years ahead of its time – simply no 
infrastructure or uptake is possible through a commercial channel. Our office 
doesn’t have the bandwidth to prospect for opportunities across the entire IP 
portfolio. TEP creates a halo of students, educators, mentors, and experts who 
look deeply into the crystal ball, and that’s hugely valuable.” 
Yet despite TEP’s progress in narrowing the technology discovery and commercialisation 
gaps, the programme had made little progress in addressing the venture launch gap. 
Transforming students into credible founding CEOs lay beyond TEP’s capabilities, and 
Oregon’s nascent ecosystem contained relatively few technology entrepreneurs with 
start-up experience who could be recruited to pilot TEP spin-outs. 
5.3 Sustainability and scalability 
The 2005 programme evaluation concluded that TEP had yet to achieve a stable and 
sustainable position. As the programme entered its fifth year, TEP continued to enjoy 
enthusiastic support of the founding partners, who hailed the programme’s educational 
value and its success in developing technology commercialisation options. The 
programme’s reputation was attracting a growing pool of capable and motivated 
applicants. Nevertheless, it was apparent that financial support from the campus 
administration and the business and law school deans could not continue to grow 
indefinitely, making it necessary to develop external funding sources. 
Programme expansion was another requirement for stability. By relying on 
bootstrapping, donated faculty time and the uncompensated assistance of members of the 
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business and investing communities, TEP had grown to serve four student teams each 
year. As its reputation spread, more students sought to participate, but programme 
resources and faculty members’ bandwidth were already stretched beyond their capacity. 
Furthermore, the ‘deal flow’ drawn from UO and PNNL’s IP portfolios was reaching its 
limit to support an expanded programme. Thus, although, TEP had developed an 
innovative model for entrepreneurial education, the programme’s continued survival 
depended on developing a new business model. 
6 Serendipity: a path to financial sustainability 
Knowledge-based economic development has been conceptualised as unfolding through a 
series of sequential transactions (Bercovitz and Feldman, 2006). The transactional 
mechanisms these authors cite are sponsored research support, agreements to license 
university intellectual property, private-sector employment of students, and the formation 
of new start-up firms. To supplement these formal transactions, Bercovitz and Feldman 
add to the list an informal mechanism that they call serendipity, an unexpected 
confluence of need and solution. 
6.1 Oregon legislature creates university venture fund 
Although investment in transferring university technology has grown in recent years, 
many institutions measure performance in terms of royalties from technology licenses but 
continue to “resist the notion that a research university should be concerned about state 
economic development” [Tornatzky, (2001), p.272]. Research findings suggest that 
technology transfer offices’ performance in “areas contributing to regional economic 
development (such as in-state licenses and licenses to start-ups) has not improved at the 
same pace” as metrics based on invention disclosures, licenses, and royalties [Waugaman 
and Tornatzky, (2001), p.3]. 
In 2005, the Oregon State Legislature reinforced the role of the state’s public 
universities as engines of regional economic development by passing an innovative bill 
providing an unprecedented tax incentive (60% state income tax credits) to corporate and 
individual donors who chose to support commercialisation of promising university 
discoveries and campus-based entrepreneurship education. The bill created the University 
Venture Fund (UVF). This legislation does not simply offer tax deductions, but grants 
dollar-for-dollar credits against state tax liabilities, creating an unusually compelling 
incentive for donors. In addition, donors can claim Federal tax deductions for their full 
contribution (UO Venture Development Fund, 2009). 
More importantly, the Oregon law was written to create an ‘evergreen’ revenue 
source: When a university realises financial returns from UVF-funded investments in 
technology commercialisation, the university repays the tax-credit contributions to the 
state treasury. Upon repayment of these ‘old’ tax credits, ‘new’ tax credits are generated 
automatically. Since state tax credits equal 60% of donors’ gifts, every dollar that is paid 
back gives the university the opportunity to bring in an additional $1.67 in  
tax-incentivised contributions. This novel financial arrangement offers a pay-as-you go 
path to building a permanent endowment. 
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6.2 Toward an entrepreneurial university 
UO’s TEP, as noted above, had met its core educational objectives and catalysed a 
handful of spinouts, but had failed to develop a sustainable business model. However, the 
programme was well positioned to seize the opportunity presented by the University 
Development Fund. Over its first five years, TEP had accumulated valuable 
organisational resources, including: 
1 educational credibility and legitimacy within academic and administrative units 
across campus 
2 a social network populated by programme mentors and advisors who occupied 
influential positions in the region’s business and investing communities 
3 a set of fine-tuned organisational routines for mobilising, incentivising, and training 
graduate students to evaluate a technology’s latent value 
4 an academic business-planning curriculum that could turn embryonic scientific 
discoveries into investment opportunities 
5 a working partnership linking the programme’s champions through bonds of trust, 
cordial relations, and shared values. 
These resources and capabilities prompted UO’s top administrators to select the TEP as 
the centre piece of the university’s strategy for raising and deploying venture fund 
donations. TEP was assimilated into a newly created entity, the ‘innovation and 
entrepreneurship programme’, and an umbrella initiative established to move the UO 
toward the ideal of an ‘entrepreneurial university’ (Etzkowitz et al., 2000). In 2007, the 
National Science Foundation’s Partnerships for Innovation Program awarded UO a grant 
to build out the programme’s infrastructure. The Oregon Nanoscience and 
Microtechnology Institute, a state-funded signature research centre, supported the new 
initiative by awarding a matching grant. 
Figure 2 Innovation and entrepreneurship initiative fills the gaps 
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The new innovation and entrepreneurship initiative’s core premise is that transferring 
scientific knowledge from the university to the private sector can promote regional 
economic development (Lockett and Wright, 2005). The large arrows at the top of  
Figure 2 (labelled TRGs, TEP Teams, and VLGs) show how the new programme’s 
design deploys three components designed to narrow the technology discovery, 
commercialisation, and venture launch gaps that proponents encountered during the 
programme’s inception and expansion. The panel at the bottom of the figure maps the six 
phases of the TEP programme (detailed in Table 1) onto the UO’s Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship initiative. 
6.2.1 Technology discovery gap 
To narrow the technology discovery gap, the UO has set up a programme to award 
competitive translational research grants to academic inventors who commit to pursuing 
proof of concept and prototyping projects to move their technologies closer to market. 
These awards are restricted to researchers who have submitted an invention disclosure, 
and who agree to actively assist a TEP student team should their technology be selected 
for analysis. To infuse market considerations, the selection of translational grant 
recipients is informed by an external advisory board made up of professionals from 
Oregon’s high technology manufacturing and venture capital investing communities. The 
first round of grants was awarded in 2008. 
6.2.2 Commercialisation gap 
To close the commercialisation gap, the UO has set out to double the number of students 
participating in the TEP programme and increase the programme’s multidisciplinary 
reach. PhD students from the sciences (who participated as consultants in earlier years) 
are now serving as full team members alongside business and law students. Engineering 
students from UO’s sister institution, Oregon State University, are being recruited for the 
2009 programme cycle. To increase the pool of technologies available for these new 
students’ commercialisation analyses, Oregon State’s technology transfer office has 
proffered intellectual property from their own portfolio for potential adoption by TEP 
teams. 
6.2.3 Venture launch gap 
To address the venture launch gap, the UO has set up a programme awarding competitive 
venture launch grants (VLGs) to accelerate the development of young companies spun 
out to commercialise technologies licensed from the UO. Funds are provided to 
promising start-ups emerging from TEP or other on-campus sources in the form of grants, 
without provision of equity or warrants. Private sector advisory board members with 
corporate and professional credentials bring market-related considerations to bear on the 
selection process. Criteria used in selecting venture launch grant recipients include: 
1 strategic importance of funding to the start-up’s development 
2 identification of an external source of investment funds that is likely to be secured by 
VLG seed funding 
3 the technology’s potential for disruption within the market segment identified 
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4 market analysis that confirms projected demand 
5 evidence that the company will be able to execute 
6 prospects for significant financial returns from the license. 
Perpetua and Floragenex, the ventures that launched from the TEP programme in 2005 
and 2006, are among the start-ups funded in the early rounds of venture launch grant 
awards. 
7 Overcoming contradictions: pitfalls and lessons 
Beginning the transformation of a venerable research university into an entrepreneurial 
university entails grafting a technology commercialisation mission onto the traditional 
academic missions of education and scientific discovery. Pursuing this new mission 
means shepherding scientific inventions across the technology discovery, 
commercialisation, and venture launch gaps. To do this, fundamental contradictions 
between learning, discovery, and commercialisation must be confronted. The creation 
and evolution of the UO’s TEP provides guidance on how these contradictions may be 
overcome. The following heuristics have emerged from our analysis: 
1 Taking a new scientific discovery to market may feel like crossing a valley of death, 
but our experience at the UO shows that the crossing may be easier if the valley is 
broken up into a series of three more tractable gaps: the technology discovery gap, 
the commercialisation gap, and the venture launch gap. 
2 Genuine commitment to interdisciplinary and experiential graduate education can 
assuage the tension between a university’s academic and commercial missions. 
Framing Oregon’s programme as a vehicle for collaborative learning rather than for 
wealth creation conferred legitimacy and overcame potential opponents’ resistance. 
Monitoring and improving learning hinged upon developing metrics that 
systematically tracked educational outcomes and benefits to students and other 
stakeholders. 
3 Graduate students are valuable human resources. Oregon’s experience shows that 
when their work is structured by a well-designed programme and timed by periodic 
milestones, collaborative learning can generate invaluable insights. When skilful 
practitioners are added as mentors, the students learn to distinguish bona fide insights 
from wild ideas. 
4 Building multi-disciplinary teams is essential. We found that students from 
professional schools need scientists to explain technologies and translate jargon. 
Technologists need business experts to explain the importance of customers and cash 
flows. Engaging lawyers early in evaluations of commercial feasibility avoids 
journeys down blind alleys. 
5 Authenticity is essential. Our experience at Oregon suggests that only by replicating 
the organic technology commercialisation process can educational and commercial 
objectives be achieved simultaneously. Technologies offered to students for 
evaluation must have genuine promise, mentors must have experience in live-fire 
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settings, and investors must evaluate the team’s business plan exactly as they would 
any other investment opportunity. Otherwise, the experiential learning opportunity 
devolves into a contrived academic exercise. 
6 Negative findings are positive outcomes. Oregon’s track record indicates that fewer 
than one out of five teams will ultimately attempt to form a business. One 
implication is that it is extremely important to set reasonable expectations, and to 
align the expectations of all participating groups. Fortunately, students learn as much 
from failure as from success, and university technology transfer offices benefit 
directly when inopportune excursions into the market are identified early and 
aborted. 
7 University technology transfer succeeds not by royalty income alone. Particularly in 
universities like Oregon that are not situated near an R&D-intensive industry cluster, 
technology transfer offices can catalyse regional economic development best by 
enabling start-ups and licensing to start-ups. 
8 Beware of mission creep. The UO began its commercialisation programme to 
cultivate experiential education and spark entrepreneurial activity on campus. 
Pursuing these goals was possible only in collaboration with the business and 
investment communities, and these collaborations injected market forces and 
pressures for regional economic development that threatened to compromise the 
programme’s original focus. Only by insuring that interdisciplinary education 
remained the programme’s ‘true north’ could the programme’s integrity and 
credibility be preserved. Whenever conflict arose between education and pursuing 
financial returns, education took precedence. 
We hope others find these observations instructive. However, the most fundamental 
lesson we take away from our analysis of Oregon’s commercialisation programme 
concerns the collaborative processes its proponents developed, not the content and 
structure of the programme they devised. The TEP programme director put it like this: 
“My central premise is that our program is exemplary in that it combines 
extraordinary interdisciplinary education with a collaborative approach to 
regional economic development. I’m not sure how different that makes us, but 
it certainly is the key to our success.” 
This collaboration drew together academic scientists, professional school faculty, 
university administrators, and technology transfer professionals. It was fuelled by a 
mixture of naiveté and perseverance, as implied in this reflection by the entrepreneurship 
centre’s director: 
“You know, right from the start TEP operated on an ‘ignorance is bliss’ basis. 
As a group, we did not follow the best practice of benchmarking and modelling 
TEP on other programs. Instead, we plunged ahead, took a problem-oriented 
approach, and invented collaborative solutions that would keep us moving 
forward together. This meant checking your ego at the door, and leaving turf 
issues on the back burner. Right from the start, all of us seemed to understand 
that the only way this thing would work was to keep all the partners on board 
and to hold each other to true partnership behaviour.” 
The UO’s new Innovation and Entrepreneurship Program has institutionalised the 
foundational TEP programme without altering the programme’s focus on 
interdisciplinary education. It draws upon hard-won lessons about technology 
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commercialisation learned throughout the TEP programme’s development. Now, thanks 
to the serendipitous enactment of Oregon’s tax-credit-funded University Venture Fund, 
the UO has fashioned a business model that has the potential to achieve long-term 
financial self-sufficiency. 
We contend that these achievements were possible only because the TEP programme 
developed organically and maintained its unwavering commitment to providing rich and 
unique educational experiences for graduate students. Consider an alternative scenario: 
imagine that a financial windfall had allowed the UO to undertake an ambitious 
programme of regional economic development with the Innovation and Entrepreneurship 
Program’s scope and objectives, but without prior firsthand experience in building the 
TEP. Assume that the charge was to spin out university technologies to form regionally-
based start-ups, but that this project had been undertaken without TEP’s stockpile of tacit 
and codified knowledge, educational credibility, reputational capital, and social 
relationships. We suspect that this effort would have been less likely to survive and 
succeed than the artless, grass-roots approach to university entrepreneurship described in 
this paper. 
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